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COMMENT
FIRST AMENDMENT-COMMERCIAL SPEECH-ATTORNEY AD-
VERTISING-KENTUCKY SUPREME COURT HOLDS ATTORNEY ADVER-
TISING IN THE FORM OF PRIVATE MAILINGS PROTECTED BY THE
CONSTITUTION. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933
(Ky. 1978).
In Kentucky Bar Association v. Stuart, 1 the Supreme Court
of Kentucky dismissed a complaint charging members of a law
firm 2 with unethical and unprofessional conduct for mailing to
real estate agencies letters advertising and pricing legal services
available through the firm. The letters, written on the firm's sta-
tionery, read as follows:
This is to advise you that our office handles all aspects of legal
work concerning real estate transactions. Our fees are as follows:
Opinion of title: 50.00
Deed preparation: 15.00
Mortgage preparation: 15.00
We guarantee that every Opinion of Title from our office is
researched by an approved attorney who is a member of the
Kentucky Bar Association. We also guarantee that if there are
no objections to title or encumbrances which must be resolved
as to title, that our opinion will be delivered to the lending
institution within 48 hours of the date of your order. We thank
you for your time and consideration in this matter.
Sincerely yours,
Thompson & Stuart3
The court, citing Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,4 declared first
1. 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978).
2. Flora Stuart and Kelly D. Thompson of the firm Thompson & Stuart.
3. 568 S.W.2d at 933.
4. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Appellants in Bates established a legal clinic "to provide legal
services at modest fees to persons of moderate income who did not qualify for governmen-
tal legal aid." Id. at 354. To generate needed business, appellants in Bates placed an
advertisement in the February 22, 1976, edition of the Arizona Republic, a large metropoli-
tan daily newspaper in Phoenix. The routine services advertised were uncontested divorce,
uncontested adoption, simple personal bankruptcy, and change of name. Prices and court
filing fees were given for each service. Following review by a special committee of the
Arizona State Bar and by the Bar's Board of Governors, the Arizona Supreme Court found
appellants in violation of a disciplinary rule proscribing attorney advertising. In re Bates,
113 Ariz. 394, 555 P.2d 640 (1976). On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
unanimously the Arizona court's holding that state regulation of attorney advertising is
1
Gellman: Comment
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30
amendment protection of attorney advertising, 5 even in privately
mailed form, "beyond dispute . ..unless the Association can
justify prohibition of such speech by an interest which will out-
weigh individual and societal interests in the commercial
speech."6 The complainant bar association argued that attorney
advertising through private mailings would be difficult to regu-
late and would present an increased possibility for deceiving po-
tential consumers of legal services. The court, however, found
those justifications insufficient to warrant restraint of this type
of commercial speech.
The Kentucky Bar Association's Trial Committee, following
a full hearing on the matter,7 found that practitioners had vio-
lated DR 2-103(A) of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, adopted as a court rule by the Supreme Court of Kentucky:
"A lawyer shall not recommend employment, as a private practi-
tioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who
has not sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer.""
The Trial Committee recommended that the attorneys receive a
private reprimand? The Association's Board of Governors agreed
with the committee's "finding that the letters constituted 'in-
person solicitation,' not advertisement . . . ,"1 but recom-
mended increasing the sanction to a public reprimand."
In its unanimous, per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court of
Kentucky specifically rejected the characterization of the letters
as in-person solicitation, noting that "[n]one of the evils are
present here which exist in the case of 'in-person solicitation.'
not forbidden by §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1970), but reversed
in a five to four decision the judgment of the Arizona court that application of the discipli-
nary rule to appellants did not offend the first amendment. The Court held that a state
may not "prevent the publication in a newspaper of. . .truthful advertisement concern-
ing the availability and terms of routine legal services." 433 U.S. at 384.
5. The court relied exclusively on the Bates' notion of constitutionally protected
commercial speech. No provision of the state constitution was cited in the opinion.
6. 568 S.W.2d at 934.
7. The president of the state bar association initiated the disciplinary proceedings in
Stuart under Ky. CT. App. R. 3.140. Although the bar association prevailed in the initial
stages of the proceedings, the attorneys remained "respondents" throughout the action
because, according to Ky. CT. App. R. 3.390, the trial committee and the board of gover-
nors can only recommend discipline. Furthermore, "[a]ny order recommending to the
court that disciplinary action be taken shall be advisory. Promptly after the filing of the
order of the board the director shall file with the clerk the entire record commencing with
the charge . . . ." Id.
8. Ky. CT. App. R. 3.130; cf. S.C. Sup. CT. R. 32, DR 2-103(A).
9. 568 S.W.2d at 933.
10. Id. at 933-34.
11. Id. at 934.
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There is not even the danger of exertion of pressure or demands
to encourage a person to make a speedy and possibly uninformed
decision whether to seek an attorney's assistance with a prob-
lem.""2 This preliminary distinction removed Stuart from the
purview of Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Association13 in which the United
States Supreme Court held state restriction of in-person solicita-
tion constitutionally acceptable.
After ruling out solicitation,14 the Kentucky court character-
ized the correspondence as a form of attorney advertising, regula-
tion of which is governed by the Bates decision holding newspaper
advertisement of routine legal services constitutionally protected.
The court did, however, consider the difference between public
advertising in Bates and private mailings in Stuart:
It is argued that by permitting private mailings two evils may
result which do not exist in the case of newspaper advertisement
and that this creates a sufficient interest to justify prohibition.
First, there is greater potential for overreaching and deceptive
practices by unscrupulous attorneys. Second, enforcement of
ethical standards of attorney advertisement will become diffi-
cult, if not impossible for the Association.'5
The court countered the first of these arguments by noting that
advertisement by attorneys in private letter form is no more likely
to proliferate deceptive practices"8 than the public advertisement
12. Id.
13. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). In Ohralik, appellant
approached two young accident victims at a time when they were especially
incapable of making ififormed judgments or of assessing and protecting their
own interests. He solicited Carol McClintock in a hospital room where she lay
in traction and sought out Wanda Lou Holbert on the day she came home from
the hospital, knowing from his prior inquiries that she had just been released.
Appellant urged his services upon the young women. . . . He emphasized that
his fee would come out of the recovery, thereby tempting the young women with
what sounded like a cost-free and therefore irresistible offer.
Id. at 467.
14. By distinguishing the attorneys' conduct from solicitation, the court impliedly
concurred in the generally accepted distinction between advertising and solicitation. The
former refers to "activities which seek to inform, notify or persuade the public, but without
the use of person-to-person encounter"; the latter refers to "similar activities involving
personal contact." Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty to Make
Legal Counsel Available, 81 YALE L.J. 1181, 1181 n.4 (1972). See generally Note,
Advertising, Solicitation and Legal Ethics, 7 VAND. L. REv. 677 (1954).
15. 568 S.W.2d at 934.
16. One of the evils of in-person solicitation suggested by complainant bar association
is, however, adaptable to private mailings:
If respondents' argument. . . is carried to its logical conclusion, it is not diffi-
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approved by the United States Supreme Court in Bates. ,7 In deal-
ing with the problem of enforcement, the court in Stuart observed
that "[a]mple protection may be assured the public by promul-
gation of a rule which requires the attorney to mail a copy of such
advertisements to the Association simultaneously with the mail-
ing of one or more of them to members of the public."
I. THE Stuart DECISION: NOT REQUIRED BY Bates
Holding for the attorneys, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
found the private mailing in Stuart and the public advertisement
in Bates constitutionally indistinguishable. The court was thus
able to maintain logical consistency in applying the notion of
protected commercial speech,'9 as extended to legal advertising in
spread disrepute to the bench and bar. As an example, an attorney, under
respondents' argument would have a constitutional right to scour the obituary
column of the local newspaper, personally contact the potential heirs of the
deceased in the midst of their grief, and boldly recommend his legal services for
the purposes of settling the estate.
Response to Petition for Review at 7.
While the argument is a bit overstated in light of Stuart's determination that the case
involved attorney advertising and not personal solicitation, the potential for mass mail-
ings by Kentucky attorneys exists after Stuart.
17. 568 S.W.2d at 934.
18. Id.
19. The now discarded doctrine of unprotected commercial speech inauspiciously
began in Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). In Chrestensen, respondent was
barred by New York authorities, pursuant to a city ordinance, from distributing handbills
advertising his display of a submarine. Following the city's initial disapproval of the
advertisement, respondent expanded his handbill to two sides of text, one containing
political commentary and the other containing a revision of the earlier advertisement.
Upon police restraint of respondent's distribution of the double-faced handbill, he sought
and was granted interlocutory and permanent injunctions. A divided court of appeals
affirmed. 122 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1941). The United States Supreme Court, unanimously
reversing, held that while freedom of communication in public thoroughfares cannot be
unduly burdened by government, "the Constitution imposes no such restraint on govern-
ment as respects purely commercial advertising." 316 U.S. at 54. The state of the law
between the Chrestensen case and Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (Virginia Pharmacy Board), was at best confusing.
See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973); New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1958). See generally Freedman,
Advertising and Solicitation by Lawyers: Legal Ethics, 'Commercial' Speech, and Free
Speech in ADVERTISING AND FREE SPEECH 67 (1976); Note, Freedom of Expression in a
Commerical Context, 78 HARv. L. REV. 1191 (1965); Note, The Constitutional Status of
Commercial Expression, 3 HAsT. CONsT. L.Q. 761 (1976); Student Project, Attorney Ad-
vertising: Bates' Impact on Regulation, 29 S.C.L. REV. 457 (1978); Note, Advertising,
Solicitation and Legal Ethics, 7 VAND. L. REv. 677 (1954); Note, Advertising, Solicitation
and the Profession's Duty to Make Legal Counsel Available, 81 YAM L.J. 1181 (1972). In
Virginia Pharmacy Board, the Court considered the constitutionality of the prohibition
4
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Bates, to the situation in Stuart. But whether the outcome of
Stuart was jurisprudentially required by the Bates decision, as
the Kentucky Supreme Court suggested,2" is highly questionable.
The Stuart decision more reasonably can be said to represent a
major extension of Bates, which explicitly dealt only with
"whether lawyers . . . may constitutionally advertise the prices
at which certain routine services will be performed."
'21
The distinctions between the two cases are far more complex
than the Stuart opinion reveals. As noted, the limitation of Bates
to routine legal services was explicit. Accordingly, the Court enu-
merated specific services within the reach of its holding: "The
only services that lend themselves to advertising are the routine
ones: the uncontested divorce, the simple adoption, the uncon-
tested personal bankruptcy, the change of name, and the like
... .,,2 The attorneys who advertised in Bates had carefully
restricted the scope of their advertisement by prefacing each of-
fered legal service with the word "uncontested," except for name
changes, which are typically uncontested proceedings. In so word-
ing their advertisement, appellants in Bates left no doubt in the
reader's mind about the nature of the service offered for the price
advertised. In contrast, the language describing offered legal serv-
ices in the Stuart letters was unqualified; the attorneys did not
restrict their offer to routine, residential real estate transactions.
of pharmaceutical advertising and observed that "the question whether there is a First
Amendment exception for 'commercial speech' is squarely before us. Our pharmacist does
not wish to editorialize on any subject . . . . The 'idea' he wishes to communicate is
simply this: 'I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price.'" 425 U.S. at 760-61.
Holding truthful commercial speech constitutionally protected, the Court reflected that
the advertising ban was indicative of the state's decision not to expose its citizens to
certain types of expression. "It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the
First Amendment makes for us." 425 U.S. at 770.
20. The court justified most of Stuart's major premises by relying on Bates as author-
ity and by reading Bates as holding constitutional protection for attorney advertising
"beyond dispute." 568 S.W.2d at 934. Furthermore, the court relied on Bates to support
"[tihe fact that an advertisement. . . in the form of a letter does not increase the likeli-
hood" of deceptive practices by attorneys. Id.
21. 433 U.S. at 367-68 (emphasis in original).
22. Id. at 372. Justice Powell quarrelled with the majority's use of the phrase "and
the like":
[The Court divides] the immense range of the professional product of lawyers
into two categories: "unique" and "routine." The only insight afforded by the
opinion as to how one draws this line is the finding that services similar to those
in appellants' advertisement are routine. . . . What the phrase "the like" em-
braces is not indicated.
Id. at 391-92 (Powell, J., joined by Stewart, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
5
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The prices quoted ostensibly yet illogically and impractically
appear to apply regardless of the physical size of the estate or the
quantum of the fee sought to be granted.
The court in Stuart need not have extended first amendment
protection to such potentially misleading advertisements because
the Bates Court recognized that
the leeway for untruthful or misleading expression that has been
allowed in other contexts has little force in the commercial
arena. . . . In fact, because the public lacks sophistication con-
cerning legal services, misstatements that might be overlooked
or deemed unimportant in other advertising may be found quite
inappropriate in legal advertising.?
Standards in lawyer advertising are therefore higher than stan-
dards for dissemination of other forms of regulated commercial
speech. Legal information intended for ultimate public consump-
tion, although routed through a middleman as in Stuart, logically
still would have to conform to the higher standard.
A further distinction can be drawn between Stuart and Bates
by focusing upon the advertising targets in the two cases. Recipi-
ents of the Stuart letters were realtors already aware of the need
for legal advice in real estate transactions, while in Bates the
advertising consumers were simply members of the general pub-
lic. This distinction is significant. Several of the key grounds
upon which the Bates decision rested, notably the elimination of
public ignorance of the cost of legal services 24 and the fostering of
informed access to the legal system,2s are less significant when the
advertising target is not a member of the general public.21 Specifi-
23. 433 U.S. at 383. The notion that even slightly misleading commercial speech
might lose its first amendment protection finds further support in Virginia Pharmacy
Board in which the Court noted:
In concluding that commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection,
we have not held that it is wholly undifferentiable from other forms. There are
commonsense differences between speech that does "no more than propose a
commercial transaction," [citation omitted] and other varieties. Even if the
differences do not justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless,
and thus subject to complete suppression by the State, they nonetheless suggest
that a different degree of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of
truthful and legitimate commercial information is unimpaired.
425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
24. Id. at 375-76.
25. Id. Of course, the Bates Court rejected the medieval notion that'a lawsuit is an
evil in itself and was unable to "accept the notion that it is always better for a person to
suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal action." 433 U.S. at 376. See also Radin,
Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REv. 48, 72 (1935).
26. Although the court in Stuart did not consider that the realtors who received the
[Vol. 30
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cally, the Court in Bates pointed out that probably those whose
access was burdened most by the general advertising ban were the
"not-quite-poor and the unknowledgeable."27 While the Bates
Court found this a convincing reason to lift the general ban, this
aspect of the Bates rationale cannot be viewed as supportive of
or applicable to Stuart because the Stuart letters were not dis-
patched to the general public.
II. Stuart AS AN EXTENTION OF Bates
The Bates opinion, therefore, did not require the result
reached by the court in Stuart. The overall advisability of Stuart
as an extension of Bates is, however, entirely another matter. The
advisability must be considered in light of Stuart's likely impact
upon consumers of legal services, because the doctrine of
protected commercial speech as clarified in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (Vir-
ginia Pharmacy Board),2" places primary emphasis on the con-
sumer's right to receive information 29 rather than on the adver-
tiser's first amendment right to disseminate it. Virginia Phar-
macy Board, which involved advertising of prescription drug
prices, was of paramount importance to the decision on attorney
advertising. The Court in Bates recognized this, commenting,
after restating the facts and law involved in Virginia Pharmacy
Board:
We have set out this detailed summary of the Pharmacy
opinion because the conclusion that Arizona's disciplinary rule
is violative of the First Amendment might be said to flow a
fortiori from it. Like the Virginia statutes, the disciplinary rule
serves to inhibit the free flow of commercial information and to
keep the public in ignorance.2
letters were middlemen in the flow of commercial speech, respondents suggested in their
petition for review that such a mailing was less offensive than a direct mailing to prospec-
tive clients: "The [attorneys] beg to differ with the findings of the Bar that these letters
were mailed to prospective clients. These letters were mailed to educated realtors. . ....
Petition for Review of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Opinion and Order of Board
of Governors, Ky. Bar Ass'n, at 1-2. While this distinction by the attorneys is valid, it
cannot be used to justify the court's analytical sidestepping of Bates.
27. 433 U.S. at 377. See generally B.F. CHRISTENSEN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF
MODERATE MEANS (1970).
28. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
29. See generally Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972); cf. Procunier
v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974); Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
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Although the Court in Virginia Pharmacy Board did mention that
the first amendment protects pharmacists wishing to advertise
prescription drug information, it quickly dispensed with that no-
tion and emphasized the interest of the consumer and of society
in the commerical speech."1 This emphasis suggests that the pro-
per focus is upon the consumer's right to receive information,
rather than upon the advertiser's first amendment rights. Simi-
larly, the right of the public to receive properly tailored legal
advertising, as that right was established by Bates, is ostensibly
firmer than any constitutional right of the lawyer to advertise.
With legal advertising, further justification exists for diverting
the first amendment focus from the advertiser: attorneys, like
pharmacists, belong to a profession that is both licensed and
heavily regulated. Indeed, "[tihe interest of the States in regu-
lating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to
the primary governmental function of administering justice, and
have historically been 'officers of the courts.' "32 Moreover, the
Court has, in the past, considered a "lawyer's procurement of
remunerative employment" as "a subject only marginally af-
fected with First Amendment concerns." 
3
In considering Stuart's impact on consumers of legal serv-
ices, the United States Supreme Court's view of the nature of
consumer interest in commercial speech therefore should be ex-
amined. In Virginia Pharmacy Board, the Court observed that
the particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial
information ... may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his
interest in the day's most urgent political debate....
Generalizing, society also may have a strong interest in the
free flow of commercial information. Even an individual adver-
tisement, though entirely "commercial," may be of general pub-
lic interest.34
The Supreme Court also characterized the consumer interest in
the flow of commercial information as a concern that private
economic decisions, which so affect the allocation of resources in
our "predominantly free enterprise economy," be reached intelli-
gently. 5 Additionally, the Court in Virginia Pharmacy Board
considered the democratic system of government well-served by
31. 425 U.S. at 762.
32. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975).
33. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 459 (1978).
34. 425 U.S. at 763-64.
35. Id. at 765.
[Vol. 30
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the free flow of commercial information, which is "indispensable
to the formation of intelligent opinions as to how that system
ought to be regulated or altered."3
Examining Stuart in light of these interests is not a straight-
forward task because the commercial speech at issue in both
Virginia Pharmacy Board and Bates flowed directly from the ad-
vertisers to potential consumers. The commercial speech involved
in Stuart, however, flowed from advertisers to realtors who, as
middlemen, were in a position to pass on the information to the
general public. Notwithstanding this distinction, the appropriate
analytical approach would parallel Bates' emphasis on the poten-
tial consumer of the legal services rather than the middleman,
because as Bates noted, laxity in advertising regulation could be
detrimental to the misled layman.
37
A member of the public is unlikely to receive the information
contained in the Stuart letters in the information's original form.
Rather, he would receive the information through conversation
with the initial recipient of the advertising, the realtor. 8 The
practical consequences of a realtor's receipt of a Stuart letter
would depend in large measure on his relationship with the attor-
neys involved. If the realtor knew and respected the firm, he
would be favorably disposed to recommend its services to his
unrepresented customers; however, if the realtor was totally un-
familar with the firm, he would be unlikely to suggest its services
to his customers. Hence, even when the commercial information
is passed on from a middleman to a member of the public in need
of retained counsel, the information is secondhand and highly
36. Id.
[The theoretical basis for constitutionally protecting any speech is that] it
conveys information necessary to the exercise of our duties as citizens, allowing
a reasoned and intelligent decision on public issues. Commercial speech per-
forms this same decision-making function. In a free-market economy, commer-
cial information is necessary so that consumers may make intelligent choices in
the marketplace. Without an adequate supply of price and product information,
consumers are forced to make blind choices. Thus, like speech concerning gen-
eral political or social topics, commercial speech must be protected to preserve
a system of free and independent choice.
Comment, The Demise of the Commercial Speech Doctrine and the Regulation of Profes-
sional's Advertising: The Virginia Pharmacy Case, 34 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 245, 256-57
(1977).
37. 433 U.S. at 383-84.
38. Once the decision has been made to regulate attorney advertising through private
mailing, the logical course is to regulate at the source. In a Stuart situation, attempting
to regulate the middleman would be contrary to the traditional, word-of-mouth manner
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susceptible to unintentional distortion.
Fear that the middleman in Stuart advertising situations
would inadequately communicate the advertising information,
however, is not itself a sufficient basis for restraining the private
mailings" because, as the Court in Bates observed, "it seems
peculiar to deny the. consumer, on the ground that the informa-
tion is incomplete, at least some of the relevant information
needed to reach an informed decision." 0 Yet the Stuart letters
were plagued with another, far more complex infirmity. The serv-
ices offered in the advertising language of the Stuart letters were
unqualified, and as discussed earlier, could be misleading. This
factor, placed into the commercial speech balancing process,'
arguably tips the scale in favor of state regulation; Virginia Phar-
macy Board and Bates leave no room to dispute the constitu-
tional propriety of a state's "dealing effectively"42 with the prob-
lem of "[a]dvertising that is false, deceptive, or misleading
.... -43 Additionally, "any concern that strict requirements for
truthfulness will undesirably inhibit spontaneity seems inapplic-
able because commercial speech generally is calculated. Indeed,
the public and private benefits from commercial speech derive
from confidence in, its accuracy and reliability."" Bates, there-
fore, should not be read as precluding a state's reasonable regu-
lation of Stuart-type attorney advertising.
III. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING IN PRIVATELY MAILED
FORM AFTER Stuart
The position that the language of the letters involved in
Stuart was ambiguous and hence the proper subject of state re-
straint, while at odds with the opinion of the Kentucky court,
does not necessarily exclude the view that well-tailored private
mailings by attorneys to middlemen or members of the public are
entitled to constitutional protection. The parameters set by the
39. This view is based upon the notion that "[u]nlike other varieties of 'second class'
speech like libel, obscenity, or fighting words, commercial speech is not in itself harmful."
Comment, Prior Restraints and Restrictions on Advertising After Virginia Pharmacy
Board: The Commercial Speech Doctrine Reformulated, 43 Mo. L. Rav. 64, 79 (1978). See
also Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the
Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 429, 431 (1971).
40. 433 U.S. at 374.
41. "After balancing the interests involved, the outcome is measured against the
degree of abridgement of the commercial expression." Comment, supra note 38, at 79.
42. Virginia Pharmacy Board, 425 U.S. at 771.
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Court in Bates for public advertising by attorneys could ade-
quately govern private legal advertising. Accordingly, had the
Stuart letters referred exclusively to transactions capable of rou-
tine disposition, and had the offer of legal services been limited
strictly to that disposition, the private mailings could justifiably
claim first amendment protection. Indeed, under this fact situa-
tion one could properly invoke the authority of Bates to logically
compel the result. The consumer interest in a real estate agent's
receipt of even a well-tailored Stuart-type private advertising
letter is not overwhelming, yet neither is the state's interest
in restraining it. The Kentucky court, however, having failed to
strictly apply Bates advertising standards to the Stuart case and
having allowed the language of Stuart letters to pass as accepta-
ble attorney advertising, has opened the door to the dangers ap-
purtenant to vague and misleading advertising.
The Stuart court's plan for enforcement of ethical standards
of attorney advertising in private mailings through a rule requir-
ing lawyers so advertising to mail copies to the bar association
may well be stifled by the difficulty in distinguishing between
deceptive and nondeceptive advertising in light of Stuart's per-
missiveness. Such a plan nevertheless would adequately monitor
private mailings tailored to Bates advertising standards.
Kentucky Bar Association v. Stuart, in extending first
amendment protection to a vaguely worded privately mailed legal
advertisement, is inconsistent with the paramount consumer in-
terests in professional advertising identified by the United States
Supreme Court in the Bates and Virginia Pharmacy Board deci-
sions. If the Kentucky court sought to extend constitutional pro-
tection of attorney advertising to private mailings, the court
would have been well advised to await a cage involving private
advertisement that adhered to the Bates' requirements of lin-
guistic precision and routineness of services offered. While some
state courts are likely to opt for first amendment protection of
properly restricted privately mailed legal advertising, it is un-
likely that the Stuart decision will persuade other jurisdictions
to adopt its lenient advertising standards.4 5
Joseph Barry Gelman
45. In the wake of Bates, but prior to the Stuart decision, the Tennessee Supreme
Court considered adoption of a court rule permitting private mailing advertising by attor-
neys. The court, however, found that such advertising "by the use of handbills [andl
circulars" would pose "insurmountable problems in enforcement." In re Petition for Rule
of Court Governing Lawyer Advertising, 564 S.W.2d 638, 644 (Tenn. 1978). Moreover, the
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tional right of commercial speech." Id. In addition, a Stuart-type issue is the subject of a
disciplinary proceeding underway against two New York attorneys for having mass mailed
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